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Abstract
We develop a model of Tiebout sorting based on decentralized income taxation, which
allows for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of the publicly provided good.
We identify three sources of welfare loss from decentralization: Imperfect redistribution,
inter-jurisdictional free-riding, and inefficient residential choice. Whereas the welfare loss
from imperfect redistribution decreases and that from free-riding rises unambiguously
as the publicly provided good becomes more pure, the welfare loss from the inefficient
residential choice depends non-monotonically on spillovers and rivalry. The equilibrium
can be characterized by relative crowding of either the rich or the poor municipality.
Our results imply that the characteristics of the publicly provided good are an important
determinant for the welfare costs of decentralization.
JEL Codes H21, H23, H41, H77; R13, R23, R50; Q58
Keywords Public goods; Tiebout; local income taxation; fiscal federalism; decentralization;
free-riding.
∗Peter-Merian-Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. b.hintermann@unibas.ch
1
1 Introduction
In the broader literature of public finance, there is a long-standing debate about the relative
merits of a centralized and a decentralized public provision of goods. This debate is compli-
cated by two features: Households and firms are typically mobile, and there may be spillovers
of the publicly provided good across jurisdictions. Examples include environmental quality, in-
frastructure (e.g., airports) and recreational facilities (e.g., sports stadiums or public parks).1
With mobile households and firms, sub-national jurisdictions compete for the tax base by
offering a package of tax rates and public goods. This issue is the subject of (capital) tax
competition models2 and of multi-jurisdiction models in the spirit of Tiebout (1956) that focus
on the endogenous sorting of households into regions.3 In these models, the public good is
almost always modeled as a publicly provided private good in the sense that it is rival in
consumption and can only be used by people living in the jurisdiction where it is produced.
An exception is a series of papers referred to as “environmental federalism” by Oates (1999),
which allow for household mobility and explicitly focus on inter-regional spillovers, but which
abstract from fiscal externalities by assuming head taxes rather than the kind of non-benefit
taxation (e.g., on capital, property or income) that is the primary source of revenue for regional
and local governments worldwide.
In this paper, we combine the insights from these two sub-strands of the literature and
propose a model of household sorting into municipalities that use income taxes to finance a
true public good.4 To do this, we extend Schmidheiny’s (2006b) framework by allowing for
various degrees of spillovers and rivalry of the publicly provided good. Using our model, we
carry out a normative analysis in the spirit of Calabrese et al. (2012) to assess the gross costs
of decentralization. Throughout the paper, we abstract from the benefits of decentralization
1According to Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, every publicly provided good or service should be
provided by the lowest possible entity which contains all households affected by the public intervention (sub-
sidiarity principle). Since this requires an impracticable plurality of entities, this perfect correspondence does
usually not apply in practice. Kaplow (2006) offers an alternative view on what kind of public goods should be
provided at what level of government, depending on the distributive incidence of such provision.
2In capital tax competition models, the populuation is usually assumed to be fixed. For reviews of this
literature, see Wilson (1999) and Wilson & Wildasin (2004).
3Reviews of sorting models are provided by Ross & Yinger (1999), Epple & Nechyba (2004), Boadway &
Tremblay (2012) and Bruelhart et al. (2015).
4Although the majority of multi-jurisdiction models focus on property taxation, income taxes represent the
most important source of revenue for municipalities worldwide (Bruelhart et al. 2015, p. 1138). Income taxes
are used in several thousand municipalities in the USA (Henchman & Sapia 2011). For an analysis about
income tax competition in Switzerland, see Feld & Kirchgaessner (2001).
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due to mitigating information asymmetries and rent-seeking (as in Sato 2003), and from an
endogenous formation of jurisdictions, which is the focus in Gravel & Thoron (2007), Gravel
& Oddou (2014) and Oddou (2016).5
In the theory section, we derive the equilibrium conditions of the model and characterize
the fiscal externality that results from the decentralized locational choice (defined as the “juris-
dictional choice externality”, or JCE, by Calabrese et al. 2012). We further derive a modified
Samuelson condition that depends on the degree of spillovers and rivalry in consumption of
the publicly provided good, and to which we can compare the decentralized outcome. In the
decentralized equilibrium, municipalities differ according to their income tax rate, the level
of public consumption, and housing prices, all of which are endogenous. Because the model
is too complex to solve analytically, we implement it numerically. We restrict our analysis
to equilibria that are characterized by segregation along (fixed) income, such that the richest
member of a municipality is poorer than the poorest member of the next-richer municipality.
Our results imply that spillovers and congestion are important determinants of the welfare loss
from decentralization, and that the special case of a publicly provided private good, on which
the literature previously focused, only allows for a limited understanding of the implications
of tax-induced household sorting.
We decompose the welfare loss associated with moving from a unified social planner model
to the fully decentralized equilibrium with majority voting into the following sources: (1) imper-
fect redistribution, (2) inter-municipal free-riding and (3) the jurisdictional choice externality
(JCE). All three inefficiencies depend on the characteristics of the public good. Whereas the
welfare loss from imperfect redistribution decreases in the level of spillovers (because public
consumption becomes more similar across regions and therefore less redistribution is required),
the welfare loss from free-riding increases with spillovers, which is intuitive.
The effect of spillovers on (3) is non-monotonic. As spillovers increase, the welfare loss
from the JCE first decreases, then increases, and finally decreases again. The intuition is as
follows: At low level of spillovers, the rich region is relatively crowded, such that we observe the
“poor chase rich” effect identified in the previous literature that focuses on publicly provided
5Whereas Oddou (2016) allows for spillovers and abstracts from a housing market, Gravel & Oddou (2014)
include a housing market but abstract from spillovers. In this paper, we abstain from investigating the necessary
and sufficient conditions in a model that includes both a housing market and spillovers, and instead focus on
the inefficiencies inherent in such a setup.
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private goods (see, e.g., Bucovetsky & Glazer 2014). Poorer households buy (small amounts of)
housing in the rich community in order to benefit from high public consumption at relatively
low personal tax payments. As spillovers increase from zero to positive levels, the incentive of
the poor to crowd into the rich region decreases and eventually disappears, and along with it
the welfare loss due to (3).
As spillovers increase further, the inefficiency of the household distribution moves in the
other direction: For intermediate levels of spillovers, we observe that it is in fact the poor
municipality that is crowded, relative to the population distribution that a social planner
would choose. This “poor flee rich” effect is new to the literature, and it is due to the fact
that households in the poor municipality can free-ride on the public production of the rich
municipality while enjoying low taxe rates and housing prices. This creates an inefficiency
that increases with the level of spillovers. Finally, as spillovers increase even more, public
consumption, taxes and housing prices converge across the municipalities such that the JCE
becomes less relevant, and the resulting welfare loss decreases.
In technical terms, our model is in the tradition of “multi-jurisdiction” sorting models, in
which voters decide about the level of a public good that is financed by local nonbenefit taxes.6
Unlike the original Tiebout model that focuses on heterogeneous preferences (and which was
proposed as a solution to the information problem haunting public production), sorting in these
models largely occurs according to income, which is inefficient. In these models, households’
residential choice (suburbs) is independent of their workplace (center), such that income can
be treated as fixed, which greatly facilitates the identification of an equilibrium. With two
exceptions, the public good modeled is a publicly provided private good (usually interpreted
as school quality) that is perfectly rival and excludable. To our knowledge, the only previous
sorting models that include residence-based nonbenefit taxes and truly public goods are by
Nechyba (1997) and Oddou (2016). These papers focus on the existence of equilibria and on
the endogenous formation of jurisdictions, from which we abstract. We apply the necessary
conditions for income sorting derived by Schmidheiny (2002) and focus on equilibria that we
identify numerically. We treat the number of municipalities as given, considering the stylized
6This literature is largely shaped by Dennis Epple and co-authors and includes, e.g., Epple & Zelenitz (1981),
Epple & Romer (1991), Epple & Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001), and focuses on the example of property
taxes. Applications based on local income taxation include Hansen & Kessler (2001a,b) and Schmidheiny
(2006b,a). Calabrese et al. (2012) is the only paper in this literature that focuses on the welfare implications
of decentralization.
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fact that most jurisdictional borders are have a long history of existence and will not be
changed due to economic outcomes alone. We describe the equilibria numerically and carry
out a normative analysis of the costs of decentralization, which is not done by Nechyba (1997)
and Oddou (2016). In this sense, our paper is a complement to their earlier work.
Kuhlmey (2017) builds on the current framework and allows for the presence of an upper-
level government that imposes a fiscal equalization scheme and a progressive income tax func-
tion, upon which municipalities choose linear multipliers. Fiscal equalization between munici-
palities turns out to be an effective measure to counter-balance the incentives for segregation in-
duced by progressive taxes (which are stronger than when using a linear income tax). Kuhlmey
abstracts from a normative analysis and does not allow for variations in the characteristics of
the publicly provided good, both of which are central in the context of the current paper.
A number of papers have focused on the implications of inter-regional spillovers with mobile
households using models of benefit taxation. Wellisch (1994) shows that the decentralized
provision of public goods with interregional spillovers is efficient, provided that migration
is costless, and is efficient for the richer region even if migration costs are important. The
underlying intuition is that with costless migration, utility levels are equalized across regions,
and no region can make itself better off at the expense of others. Free-riding would simply
induce more immigration, driving returns to labor down until utilities are equalized once again
(this is modeled by assuming decreasing returns to labor in each region, following the work
by Myers 1990, Mansoorian & Myers 1993). If migration is costly, regional welfare will not be
equalized, but the rich region has an incentive to provide transfer payments to other regions in
order to limit immigration. Positive spillovers replace these transfer payments one for one, such
that as a result, the rich region has an incentive to produce the socially optimal amount of the
public good.7 Hoel & Shapiro (2003, 2004) and Hoel (2004) generalize Wellisch’s 1994 model
to different policy instruments available to the regional governments and different assumptions
about the mobility of the population. Bloch & Zenginobuz (2006) examine the consequence
of asymmetric spillovers across regions, and Bucovetsky (2011) derives sufficient conditions for
decentralized public policy to be Pareto efficient. This model class is very different from ours,
because it abstracts from fiscal inefficiencies and does not endogenize the policy outcome as a
7Silva & Caplan (1997), Caplan et al. (2000) and Caplan & Silva (2011) extend these models by adding a
federal government that can enforce interregional transfers. Because the example provided in these papers is
often the environment, this literature has been referred to as “environmental federalism” by Oates (1999).
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consequence of household (and voter) mobility, but instead focuses on the strategic interaction
among regions using game theoretical tools. Despite the different modeling framework, we
generate qualiatively similar results in the sense that the presence of spillovers can mitigate
utility differences across regions that tend to arise from decentralization.
Last, spillovers have also been investigated in the context of capital tax competition. In
these models, capital flows across jurisdictional borders but the population is held fixed, which
sidesteps many of the issues related to endogenous sorting and voting that are a central focus
of Tiebout-inspired sorting papers like ours. Bjorvatn & Schjelderup (2002) and Ogawa (2006)
find that spillovers reduce the incentives for capital tax competition, and can even eliminate
them in the special case of pure public goods.8 In Bloch & Zenginobuz (2015), capital is fixed
and labor is the (imperfectly) mobile factor that moves across borders in response to regional
tax rates set by regional governments. The authors show that mobility increases the cost of
decentralization, and that the regional tax rate is a non-monotonic function of inter-regional
spillovers. Again, these results are qualitatively similar to ours, despite having been derived
using a very different modeling framework.
In the next section, we present our theoretical model, which we implement numerically in
section 3. Section 4 contains the welfare analysis, and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We start by describing the general structure of the decentralized model and provide the neces-
sary conditions for an equilibrium characterized by the self-selection of households into jurisdic-
tions or municipalities according to income. We will refer to municipalities for the remainder
of the paper, because we have a metropolitan model in mind where the choice of the residential
location is independent of the choice of the work location (usually assumed to be in the central
business district); however, the model could also be applied to larger jurisdictions such as states
or cantons, provided that income possibilities are independent of the location of residence. We
also formulate a first-best version of the model, where a social planner determines the distri-
8For the special case of positive spillovers that are proportional to a fixed capital stock, Ogawa & Wildasin
(2009) show that local policy choices are efficient. However, if capital supply is elastic, the decrease in spillovers
from other regions is smaller, making it optimal for regional governments to choose tax rates that are lower
than what would be socially optimal (Eichner & Runkel 2012). Armbruster & Hintermann (2018) add a federal
government and discuss the conditions under which the outcome is efficient.
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bution of households, the tax rate and thus the level of publicly provided goods in each region,
and also has access to an individualized transfer scheme.
2.1 Decentralized equilibrium
The model consists of j = 1, . . . , J municipalities. Each municipality decides upon the pro-
duction of a publicly provided good Gj, which is financed using a linear income tax rate tj.
The municipality-specific tax rate is determined by majority vote of the residents (see below).
We choose quantities that set the unit cost of public production to one, such that the level of
public provision in municipality j is given by
Gj = tjYj, (1)
where Yj refers to aggregate income in municipality j. With spillovers and imperfect rivalry,
consumption of the publicly provided good is determined by
gj =
Gj + σ
∑
i 6=j Gi(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ , (2)
where Nj is the population residing in municipality j and σ ∈ [0, 1] determines the degree of
interjurisdictional spillovers, with σ = 0 implying no spillovers and σ = 1 implying perfect
spillovers.9 The numerator in (2) contains public provision in the home municipality j and
in the other municipalities i 6= j, weighted by the spillover parameter σ, which means that
spillovers are symmetric between jurisdictions. Rivalry in consumption enters in the denomi-
nator via ρ ∈ [0, 1]: If ρ = 0, there is no rivalry in consumption of the publicly provided good,
whereas rivalry is perfect at ρ = 1. The term Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni is the mass of households that
have access to the publicly provided good in j. The ‘neighborhood’ parameter ν ∈ [0, 1] is
a parameter that measures the degree to which households from outside municipality j have
access to consume the publicly provided good in j. While σ measures the degree to which a
public good ‘spills out’ of a region (e.g., in the form of water quality), ν measures the degree
9Our equations (1) and (2) representing the production and consumption levels of the publicly provided
good have been inspired by Oddou (2016). The definitions of production Gj and consumption gj imply that
these variables have different units: While Gj is equal to aggregate production in j and therefore measured
in units of the publicly provided good, consumption gj describes the amount that every household in j can
consume and is therefore measured in units of the publicly provided good per household.
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to which the population from other regions can ‘spill in’ and consume the public goods (e.g.,
public infrastructure) in region j. The extent to which this deteriorates congestion in region j
depends on ρ. In our numerical implementation, we assume that σ = ν. However, we do not
restrict our model at this stage.
The combination of (ρ = 0, σ = ν = 1) describes the case of a pure public good, where con-
sumption equals the sum of what all municipalities provide. At the other end of the spectrum,
the combination (ρ = 1, σ = ν = 0) describes a purely private good, of which a household living
in municipality j consumes the amount gj = Gj/Nj. Any parameter combination in between
these limits describes an intermediate case.10 Furthermore, the model could be adapted to the
case of asymmetric spillovers.11
Housing is supplied elastically by absentee landlords based on a constant returns to scale
(CRS) technology. Housing market clearing implies that
HSj (pj)−
∫ yj
yj
hj(y)f(y)dy = 0 ∀j, (3)
where HSj is the aggregate housing supply function and the integral describes the aggregate of
households’ demand for housing in municipality j. Because the amount of available land is fixed,
the marginal cost of housing is increasing in housing demand. Thus, the attractiveness of the
tax-expenditure package of a municipality is capitalized into housing prices pj. No other taxes
or publicly provided goods exist, such that from the perspective of households, municipalities
are fully characterized by the triplet (pj, tj, gj).
12 This leads to different possible tradeoffs
between the attributes of the municipalities. The only thing we can say is that no municipality
10Not all parameter combinations are equally meaningful. For example, it would make no sense to define the
publicly provided good as perfectly rival in consumption (ρ = 1), but at the same time allow for interjurisdic-
tional spillovers (σ > 0) or neighbors to consume (ν > 0), because any outsiders could be easily excluded from
consuming the good at home or by crossing borders. The combination (ρ = σ = 0) would describe a club good
for which households from outside the municipality can be excluded.
11Instead of specifying ν and σ as single parameters, we would define both as J × J matrices, with νjj =
σjj = 1. 0 ≤ σij ≤ 1 ∀ i 6= j is then the degree of spillover from municipality i to j, and 0 ≤ νij ≤ 1 ∀ i 6= j
describes the extent to which households from municipality i have access to consume the publicly provided
good in j. (2) would then read as gj =
∑J
i=1 σijGi/(
∑J
i=1 νijNi)
ρ. Since we rely on symmetric spillovers in our
numerical application, we decided to keep the general model as simple as possible. Asymmetric spillovers could
be used to reflect the spacial structure of a metropolitan area, whereas the assumption of symmetric spillovers
renders the model essentially spaceless.
12This differs from models of property tax competition where the tax and the housing price are combined,
such that municipalities differ in two dimensions only: the gross-of-tax housing price, and the level of the
publicly provided good. Note that Gj is irrelevant for households’ relocation decisions, since what matters for
utility is the consumption level gj and not municipality j’s contribution to the publicly provided good.
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can be worse off along all three dimensions, as no one would live in this municipality (which
would drive down the resulting housing price).
Households differ with respect to exogenous income y, which is distributed on the do-
main (y, y) according to the probability density function f(y). Conditional on their residential
choice (and thus the level of public consumption), they maximize their utility by choosing
their preferred level of numeraire consumption xj and housing hj, subject to a budget con-
straint. Solving this problem yields an indirect utility function, which depends on municipality
characteristics and personal income:
V (pj, tj, gj; y) = max
x,h
U(xj, hj, gj) s.t. y(1− tj) = xj + pjhj. (4)
Households choose the municipality in which they wish to reside. If the endogenous lo-
cational choice of households leads to an equilibrium where the richest member of any given
municipality is poorer than the poorest member of the next richer municipality, this is referred
to as (complete) segregation by income. For the case of local income taxation, Schmidheiny
(2002) identified two sufficient conditions for income segregation, provided that an equilibrium
exists:13 First, the marginal rates of substitution between any arguments of the indirect utility
function must change monotonically in income, which is known as the ‘single-crossing condi-
tion’, because it ensures that the indifference curves of two households with different incomes
cross only once. Second, preferences have to satisfy a condition called ‘proportional shift in
relative preferences’ for income. One class of utility functions that complies with the Schmid-
heiny (2002) conditions is the Stone-Geary utility function, which adds subsistence levels of
consumption to the Cobb-Douglas utility function. We use this in Section 3. The migration
behavior of households depends on their income and their preferences, which determine how
households trade off private and public consumption as well as tax rates. This trade-off does
not change if we introduce varying degrees of spillovers or congestion, as they only affect the
production technology of the public provision. Therefore, the necessary conditions identified
for publicly provided private goods apply here as well.
We order municipalities in ascending order of average income such that under perfect income
13Note that Schmidheiny cannot establish conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, but can show that
if one exists, his conditions ensure that it is characterized by a segregation of households according to income.
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segregation, every member in municipality j is (weakly) richer than every member of munic-
ipality j − 1. For any two adjacent municipalities j and j − 1, there exists a household with
income y˜j−1,j that is indifferent between them. Formally, this means that V (pj, tj, gj; y˜j−1,j) =
V(pj−1, tj−1, gj−1; y˜j−1,j). The indifferent household is thus determined by the characteris-
tics of both municipalities. A migration equilibrium under income segregation requires that
the indifferent households are the municipality ‘borders’, i.e., that y˜j−1,j = yj(= yj−1) and
y˜j,j+1 = yj(= yj+1), where the lower and upper bar represents the poorest and the richest
households in municipality j, respectively. A sorting equilibrium has been reached if nobody
has an incentive to move:
∀ y ∈ [yj, yj]: V (pj, tj, gj; y)− V (pi, ti, gi; y) ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j ∀ j. (5)
The equation holds with equality only for the border households between municipalities that
are adjacent in the income ranking.14
Households vote about their preferred tax rate, which we formalize as a (non-cooperative)
two-stage game.15 In the first stage, households choose their location and buy housing, cor-
rectly anticipating the voting outcome in every municipality. In the second stage, households
determine the level of public production along with the necessary tax rate to satisfy the budget
constraint by majority vote, and consumption takes place. When voting, we therefore follow
Calabrese et al. (2012, Footnote 9) and assume that households take the distribution of house-
holds, their consumption decisions, as well as the aggregate income and population in each
municipality (defined by Yj = Nj
∫ yj
yj
yf(y)dy and Nj = N
∫ yj
yj
f(y)dy, respectively, with N
the total population) as given. Furthermore, they perfectly foresee the other municipalities’
contributions to the publicly provided good.16
14The empirically more realistic case of an ‘imperfect sorting’ of households requires that households differ
with respect to income and additionally some preference parameter, as in Epple & Platt (1998). The model
would then require that (5) holds for all values of the second source of heterogeneity, i.e. that there is income
segregation conditional on the value of the preference parameter (see Schmidheiny 2002, 2006b).
15Loeper (2017) compares public consumption levels in a non-cooperative setup with the case of Coasian
cooperation. Abstracting from household mobility and tax competition, he finds that cooperation mitigates
the free-riding incentives only if the demand for the publicly provided good is not too inelastic, irrespective of
the size of the spillovers.
16There is an ongoing debate in the literature concerning voter myopia. Even if voters are assumed to be
‘myopic’ as in Schmidheiny (2006b), because they do not consider migration responses and housing demand
reactions to a marginal change in the municipalities’ tax rates, this is of no consequence in an equilibrium, where
nobody has an incentive to move or to change housing consumption by definition. In this sense, the difference
between myopic and perfectly rational voters is moot. Outside of the equilibrium, however, the degree of voter
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The maximization problem for the voter with income y is given by
max
tj ,gj
V (pj, tj, gj; y) s.t. gj =
tjYj + σ
∑
i 6=j Gi(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ . (6)
The median voter ymj in municipality j is implicitly defined by
∫ ymj
yj
f(y)dy = 1
2
∫ yj
yj
f(y)dy.
Due to the monotonicity of preferences, the median income households are the only households
that maximize utility. All others do not obtain their optimal tax rate, although they (weakly)
prefer the triple (pj, tj, gj) in their municipality to that in other municipalities.
Substituting the municipality’s budget constraint and considering y = ymj , the first-order
condition with respect to tj is
∂V (pj, tj, gj; y
m
j )
∂tj
+
∂V (pj, tj, gj; y
m
j )
∂gj
Yj(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ = 0. (7)
This implicitly defines the tax rate for every municipality for given contributions to the pub-
licly provided good of the other municipalities. A voting outcome in our local income tax
competition model constitutes a Nash equilibrium such that, for every j, Gj = tjYj is a best
reply to the corresponding provisions Gi ∀ i 6= j.
The set of necessary equilibrium conditions of the model can be summarized as follows:
Migration equilibrium. The indifferent households between adjacent municipalities are at
the actual ‘border’ of every municipality; i.e., (5) holds with equality only for yj and yj.
All households in between strictly prefer municipality j to any other municipality.
Majority voting equilibrium. The tax rate in every municipality is chosen such that equa-
tion (7) holds, and the corresponding provisions of the publicly provided good are corre-
sponding best replies.
Housing market equilibrium. Equation (3) holds in every municipality.
This results in a system of 3J−1 equations (note that there are only J−1 indifferent house-
holds) and 3J − 1 unknowns (housing prices, public provision levels and border households).
rationality presumably matters. Since our model does not allow us to say anything about the dynamics of the
system, we maintain the hypothesis of perfect foresight for simplicity.
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Neither existence nor uniqueness can be established, as is usually the case in tax competition
problems. Without further assumptions on preferences, it is not possible to analytically de-
termine the effect of spillovers and imperfect rivalry on equilibrium outcomes. For the case
of Stone-Geary preferences, however, we solve the model for various combinations of σ and ρ
numerically and quantify the inefficiencies in Section 3.
2.2 Efficiency benchmark
To identify the inefficiencies from decentralization, we formulate a first-best version of our
model. A planner maximizes a social welfare function by assigning the population across mu-
nicipalities and choosing the efficient level of public provision and taxation. The social planner
has access to revenue-neutral individual transfers r(y) in addition to uniform head taxes in
every municipality Tj, which in combination constitute individualized lump-sum taxation. We
specify that the sum of transfer payments is zero in order to allow for a clean separation
between taxes used to finance the publicly provided good and for the revenue-neutral redistri-
bution of income. In order to compare the outcome with the decentralized equilibrium and to
be prepared for the Decomposition of the welfare loss , we additionally include income taxes
as a policy instrument, even though they will obviously not be used if lump-sum taxation is
available.
The indirect utility function of a household with exogenous income y living in municipality
j is a generalized version of (4) and is given by
V (pj, tj, Tj, gj; y, r(y)) = max
x,h
U(xj, hj, gj)
s.t. y(1− tj) + r(y)− Tj = xj + pjhj, (8)
where y(1 − tj) + r(y) − Tj is the after-tax income of the household. For brevity, we define
V j(y) ≡ V (pj, tj, Tj, gj; y, r(y)). Borrowing notation from Calabrese et al. (2012), we write the
12
first-best problem as
max
aj(y),r(y),R,tj ,Tj ,pj ,gj
J∑
j=1
{∫ y
y
ω(y)V j(y) aj(y)f(y)dy + ωR
(
R
J
+
∫ pj
0
HS(z)dz
)}
(9)
s.t. gj =
tjYj + TjNj + σ
∑
i 6=j(tiYi + TiNi)(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ ∀ j (10)
HS(pj) =
∫ y
y
hj(y) aj(y)f(y)dy ∀ j (11)
R +
∫ y
y
r(y)f(y)dy = 0, (12)
where ω(y) is the welfare weight placed on households with income y, and ωR is the welfare
weight that relates the monetary transfer R to the absentee landlords (which may be negative)
and their economic rent into social welfare.17 The choice variable aj(y) ∈ [0, 1] represents the
share of the population with income y that resides in municipality j, with
∑
j aj(y) = 1. For
all income segregating equilibria, aj(y) = 1 if y ∈ (yj, yj) and ai 6=j(y) = 0.
We assign the following Lagrange multipliers: λj for the budget constraint of the munici-
pality (10), ηj for housing market clearing (11), and Ω for the revenue-neutrality of the income
transfers (12).
The marginal social value of adding a unit measure of the population with income y to mu-
nicipality j, MSVj(y), is given by the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to aj(y)f(y):
18
MSVj(y) =ω(y)V
j(y) +
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)[
tjy + Tj
]
+ ηjh
j(y)
− ρ
{
λjgj
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j
Ni
)ρ−1
+ σ
∑
i 6=j
λigi
(
Ni + ν
∑
k 6=i
Nk
)ρ−1}
. (13)
For income-segregating equilibria, which are the focus in this paper, the social planner
chooses the border household yborderi,j between any two adjacent municipalities i and j such that
17Our treatment of housing rents is the same as in Calabrese et al. (2012). Alternatively, one could, for
example, assume that housing is collectively owned by the local population. While this would pose no problem
for the first-best setting, it would require a redistribution scheme for (endogenous) housing profits in the
decentralized model. Note that setting the welfare weight on the landlords to zero would lead to a complete
expropriation of the landlords (the optimal transfer would be minus infinity). One could limit this by forcing
R = 0, but this would lead to a non-closed model that would not be suitable for normative analysis.
18Note that the MSVj(y) is generally nonzero, because the control variable aj(y) is at a corner solution for
equilibria characterized by income segregation (either zero or one); the complementary slackness conditions
have been omitted in (13) for notational convenience.
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MSVi(y
border
i,j ) = MSVj(y
border
i,j ). All poorer (richer) households have a strictly higher marginal
social welfare in the poorer (richer) municipality when compared to the other municipality.
Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, the first-order conditions with respect to r(y)
and R can be combined to
J∑
j=1
ω(y)V jy (y)aj(y) +
J∑
j=1
ηjh
j
y(y)aj(y) = ωR. (14)
The remaining first-order conditions are
Tj :
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jT (y)aj(y)f(y)dy +Nj
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)
+ ηj
∫ y
y
hjT (y)aj(y)f(y)dy = 0 (15)
tj :
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jt (y)aj(y)f(y)dy + Yj
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)
+ ηj
∫ y
y
hjt(y)aj(y)f(y)dy = 0 (16)
pj :
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jp (y)aj(y)f(y)dy + ωRH
S(pj) + ηj
[ ∫ y
y
hjp(y)aj(y)f(y)dy −HSp (pj)
]
= 0 (17)
gj :
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)aj(y)f(y)dy − λj
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j
Ni
)ρ
+ ηj
∫ y
y
hjg(y)aj(y)f(y)dy = 0 (18)
Together with the constraints (10)–(12), conditions (13)–(18) represent the full model.19
In the first-best equilibrium, i.e., with individualized transfers and head taxes, it follows that
tj = 0 and (16) drops out. Constrained versions of the model can be derived by denying the
planner access to individualized transfers and head taxes, by allowing households to choose
their preferred municipality, and by allowing municipalities to decide on the desired level of
public provision by majority vote. Such second-best versions are considered in Section 4.2.
We are now set to investigate the welfare loss from decentralization. Because we take the
view of a fully informed social planner, decentralization necessarily leads to a welfare loss,
as it amounts to placing constraints on the first-best problem. We abstract from the welfare
gains from decentralization, which may more than offset the costs. There are three sources
that contribute to the aggregate welfare loss when moving from the first-best to the fully
decentralized solution.
19This set of efficiency and equilibrium conditions are valid for interior solutions. For the problem at hand,
however, some parameter combinations would give rise to a corner solution. For example, if rivalry and spillovers
are (very) low and if the housing supply elasticity is sufficiently high or the municipality sizes sufficiently
heterogeneous, it might be optimal for the social planner to leave one municipality empty (just as we encountered
for the decentralized case). In such cases, (13)–(18) would continue to hold for the occupied jurisdictions.
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(1) Imperfect redistribution. This is a consequence of the (standard) assumption that in the
decentralized setting, lump-sum taxes are not available such that income redistribution
only takes place via public provision financed by non-benefit taxes.
(2) Inter-municipal free-riding. There is an underprovision of the publicly provided good be-
cause the local median voter does not consider the benefit accruing to other municipalities.
In our model, this inefficiency includes the inefficiency from voting per se, i.e., the welfare
loss that arises from setting the tax rate by the median voter rather than a regional social
planner. We show in our numerical application that this effect is small.
(3) Inefficient allocation of the population. This is due to the free mobility of the households
and can be interpreted as intra-municipal free-riding, as households seek to consume more
of the public good than the amount they contribute in the form of income tax payments.
Calabrese et al. (2012) call the inefficiency in (3) the “jurisdictional choice externality”
(JCE), and we will make use of this term for the remainder of the paper. The JCEj(y) that
a household with income y imposes on society when being added to municipality j can be
obtained by subtracting the private component from the MSV (13) and substituting (10):
JCEj(y) =
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)
(tjy + Tj) + ηjh
j(y) (19)
− ρ
(
λj
tjYj + TjNj + σ
∑
i 6=j tiYi + TiNi
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
+ σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
tiYi + TiNi + σ
∑
k 6=i tkYk + TkNk
Ni + ν
∑
k 6=iNk
)
.
The first term of the JCE is the (positive) social value of the tax payment by this household.
This value accrues not only to residents in municipality j but also to those in all other mu-
nicipalities due to the spillovers. The third term reflects the aggregate congestion cost, again
arising in all municipalities, and is negative. With zero congestion, this term drops out.
The second term measures the social cost or benefit of adding another household to the
housing market and can be positive or negative. To gain an intuition about the nature of this
last source of inefficiency, we solve (17) for ηj:
ηj =
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jp (y)a(y)jf(y)dy + ωRH
S(pj)
HSp (pj)−
∫ y
y
hjp(y)aj(y)f(y)dy
. (20)
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Under regular assumptions about the demand and the supply of housing, the denominator
is positive, whereas the two terms in the numerator have opposite signs. If the welfare weight
placed on the absentee landlords is sufficiently small, it follows that ηj < 0, and vice versa.
Intuitively, if the landlords do not contribute much value to social welfare, adding population
to municipality j increases the housing price for all residents in that municipality, which is
only partially offset by social benefits in the form of higher economic rents for the landlords.20
In a first-best environment where the social planner has access to individualized lump-sum
taxation, chooses the level of local provision of public goods and assigns the population across
municipalities, the allocation of the population is efficient such that ηj = 0 ∀ j (see Calabrese
et al. 2012, Prop. 3). A version of the proof using our setting (i.e., income rather than property
taxation) is included in Appendix A1.
We can now state our first proposition:
Proposition 1. Jurisdictional choice externality (JCE)
(i) In a first-best environment where the social planner has access to individualized lump-sum
taxation, chooses the level of local provision of public goods and assigns the population
across municipalities, the JCE for a publicy provided private good is zero.
(ii) In the presence of positive spillovers and/or imperfect congestion, the JCE is generally
nonzero even in first-best. In this case, the sign of the JCE is determined by the relative
strength of spillovers and congestion.
(iii) If revenue is raised via an income tax, the JCE increases with household income, provided
that the housing market externality is not too negative.
(iv) The social planner allocates the population such that the JCE associated with the border
household is equalized across the relevant municipalities: JCEj(y˜j,j+1) = JCEj+1(y˜j,j+1).
(Proof in Appendix A2.)
Intuitively, adding a household to a municipality increases both public production and
congestion. Whether the net effect is positive depends on the available policy instruments
20To avoid a possible confusion, note that ηj is not a measure for the housing price. The planner assigns people
across jurisdictions. ηj measures to what extent this assignment differs from the assignment that households
themselves would choose.
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(head vs. income taxes), the nature of the public good, the income of the household, and the
average income and population size of the municipality to which the household is added. With
income taxation, adding a rich household to a municipality increases public consumption by
more than adding a poor household, all else equal. Note, finally, that due to the presence of
spillovers, the JCE can be positive (or negative) for all municipalities, such that the inefficiency
of the locational choice is due to the difference in the JCE’s of the relevant municipalities, not
their absolute values.
We now turn to inefficiency (2), the inter-municipal free-riding on the provision of the
publicly provided good elsewhere. Conditions (14), (15) and (18) can be combined to obtain a
relatively complicated optimality condition (see in the Appendix). Under first-best conditions,
this expression can be simplified, which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Public production
(i) In a first-best environment where tj = ηj = 0, the following expression provides a modified
Samuelson condition that allows for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption:
∫ y
y
V jg (y)
V jy (y)
aj(y)f(y)dy =
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
1 + σ(J − 1) . (21)
(ii) In the first-best equilibrium, the marginal value of public funds is equalized across munic-
ipalities:
λj = λ =
ωR
1 + σ(J − 1) ∀ j. (22)
(Proof in theh Appendix.)
The LHS of (21) is the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between public consumption
and the numeraire, and the RHS is the marginal rate of transformation. For the special case
of a publicly provided private good (ρ = 1 and σ = ν = 0), the Samuelson condition simplifies
to the familiar form of
∫ y
y
V jg (y)
V jy (y)
aj(y)f(y)dy = Nj, (23)
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where Nj equals the marginal rate of transformation between the publicly provided good and
the numeraire.
Condition (22) states that the marginal value of public funds is equalized across munici-
palities, and that the greater the inter-municipal spillovers, the more resources are optimally
used for the production of the publicly provided good (such that λ becomes smaller; note that
with concave preferences, λj has to decrease in gj). This is intuitive, since spillovers increase
the benefit of public provision without increasing its cost, leading to a higher optimal level of
public provision, all else being equal.
In the fully decentralized equilibrium, the median voter determines the amount of public
provision from (7). There is no closed-form solution for the level of public provision in this
general form. In the next section, we impose some structure on the preferences, which allows us
to derive expressions for the contribution to the publicly provided good in the social optimum
and the decentralized equilibrium.
3 Numerical implementation
In this section, we carry out a numerical illustration of our theory.21 We derive analytical
results for the resulting equilibrium conditions and the degree of public under-provision due
to inter-municipal free-riding. Last, we numerically compute the distribution of households
and the level of public and private consumption in the decentralized equilibrium, for varying
degrees of spillovers and rivalry in consumption.
3.1 Equilibrium conditions
We define preferences using a Stone-Geary utility function, which complies with the sufficient
conditions for income segregation as discussed in Schmidheiny (2002):
Uj(x
j, hj, gj) = αln(gj − βg) + γln(hj − βh) + (1− α− γ)ln(xj − βx), (24)
21We would like to stress that this is not an empirical application. A calibration of the model to actual data
would require the use of an additional heterogeneity, other than income, because in practice pure sorting based
on income is never observed.
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where βg, βh and βx are subsistence levels for gj, h
j and xj, respectively, and α, γ and 1−α−γ
(all of which are between zero and one) are the corresponding preference parameters. Solving
the consumer’s problem leads to a demand function for housing and the numeraire good of
hj(y) = βh + γ
y(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx
(1−α)pj and x
j(y) = y(1− tj) + r(y)− Tj − pjhj(y), respectively,
where r(y) is the individual lump-sum transfer for household y, and Tj is the municipality-
specific lump-sum head tax to finance public provision; if these instruments are not available
(as it is the case in the fully decentralized equilibrium), they are set to zero.
The indirect utility function is given by
V (pj, Tj, tj, gj; y) =(1− α)ln[y(1− tj) + r(y)− Tj − pjβh − βx]
+ αln(gj − βg)− γln(pj) + c, (25)
with c ≡ (1−α− γ)ln (1−α−γ
1−α
)
+ γln
(
γ
1−α
)
. The derivatives of the indirect utility function and
the set of first-best efficiency conditions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The housing market clearing condition (3) is defined by
Ljp
θ
j −
∫ yj
yj
(
γ
y(1− tj) + r(y)− Tj − pjβh − βx
(1− α)pj + βh
)
f(y)dy = 0, (26)
where Ljp
θ
j is the housing supply function, Lj ∈ [0, 1] is the relative land size of municipality j
(i.e., we normalize aggregate land to unity), and θ is the price elasticity of the housing supply.
In the fully decentralized setting (where r(y) = Tj = 0), the household that is indifferent
between the two adjacent municipalities j and j − 1 is defined by
y˜j−1,j =
(pjβh + βx)p
γ
1−α
j−1 (gj − βg)
α
1−α − (pj−1βh + βx)p
γ
1−α
j (gj−1 − βg)
α
1−α
(1− tj)p
γ
1−α
j−1 (gj − βg)
α
1−α − (1− tj−1)p
γ
1−α
j (gj−1 − βg)
α
1−α
, (27)
3.2 Public production
For the median income household in municipality j, ymj , the first-order condition with respect
to the tax rate (7) derived from the voter’s maximization problem becomes
(1− α)ymj
ymj (1− tj)− pjβh − βx
=
αYj
tjYj + σ
∑
i 6=j Gi −
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
βg
. (28)
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We can solve (28) for tjYj, which by the municipality budget constraint defines municipality
j’s contribution to the publicly provided good for an interior solution of tj:
22
Gdecj =
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j
Ni
)ρ
βg +
α
1− α
(
Y dispj −Nj
E[yj]− ymj
ymj
(pjβh + βx)
)
− σ
∑
i 6=j
Gi, (29)
where Y dispj ≡ Nj · (E[yj](1− tj)− pjβh − βx) is the aggregate disposable municipality income
and E[yj] is the mean income, such that (E[yj] − ymj )/ymj measures the right-skewness of the
income distribution.
The contribution of municipality j to the publicly provided good is determined by three
terms. The first term is the subsistence level of the publicly provided good, adjusted for the
population that has access to the domestic market and corrected for congestion. The second
term describes the median voter’s demand for public provision in excess of the subsistence level.
Finally, the optimal level of public provision in the municipality is reduced by what spills over
from the other municipalities (third term). In the absence of spillovers, this term drops out.23
The contribution to the publicly provided good increases in the preference parameter: The
higher is α, the more is spent on the publicly provided good. If α is zero, public provision only
takes place to satisfy the subsistence level, which may be partially or fully met by the spillovers
from the other municipalities. If the third term exceeds the sum of the first and second terms,
the municipality free-rides completely on the public provision of the other municipalities. Last,
note that Gj = tjYj, with tj chosen by the median voter, is limited by 0 ≤ tj ≤ 1.
The Pareto-optimal counterpart to (29) can be deduced from the Samuelson condition (21)
22To help the reader with the derivation of (29), note that (28) solves to tjYj ≡ Gdecj =(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
βg +
α
1−α
Yj
ymj
(
ymj (1− tj)− pjβh − βx
) − σ∑i 6=j Gi. Substitute Yj = NjE[yj ] in the sec-
ond term, bring
E[yj ]
ymj
inside the bracket, and add and subtract (pjβh + βx) to obtain
α
1− αNj
(
E[yj ](1− tj)− (pjβh + βx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Y dispj /Nj
+(pjβh + βx)− E[yj ]/ymj · (pjβh + βx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−(E[yj ]−ymj )/ymj ·(pjβh+βx)
)
.
23Even in the case without spillovers, the supply of the publicly provided good depends indirectly on the
other municipalities’ choices, which affect the population distribution and therefore determine Nj and Yj along
with the housing price pj and the median voter y
m
j .
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derived for the benchmark model. Using our functional forms, it is given by24
GPOj =
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j
Ni
)ρ
βg +
α
1− αY
disp
j (1 + σ(J − 1))− σ
∑
i 6=j
Gi. (30)
One way to assess the consequence of free-riding is to evaluate (29) and (30) for a given
distribution of the population, and a given level of public production in municipalities i 6= j
(which is of course not the case in the different equilibria). Holding these values fixed, (29)
and (30) differ by their respective middle terms only:
GPOj −Gdecj =
α
1− α
[
Y dispj · σ(J − 1) +Nj
E[yj]− ymj
ymj
(pjβh + βx)
]
. (31)
Under regular conditions where E[yj] ≥ ymj , (31) is positive, implying public under-provision
in the decentralized setting. Decentralized public provision is only efficient for the special case
of publicly provided private goods and a symmetric income distribution.
In our numerical model, we calculate public consumption at various steps of decentraliza-
tion, thus taking into account the population distribution and the public production in other
municipalities (see bottom panel in Figure 7). The decentralized setting of taxes has by far
the largest effect on the decrease in public consumption, relative to constrained redistribution
and inefficient residential choice.
3.3 Decentralized equilibrium
A decentralized equilibrium requires that housing markets clear (J housing prices solve J
equations (26)), that tax rates constitute a majority voting equilibrium (J median voters choose
public provision levels according to J equations (29)), and that the indifferent households are
at the municipalities’ borders (J − 1 indifferent households are determined by J − 1 equations
(27)). Note that even for the most simple setup, this set of equilibrium conditions cannot
be solved analytically. In this subsection, we provide quantitative results from a numerical
implementation of the decentralized equilibrium for varying values of spillovers and congestion.
24To derive (30), substitute the partial derivatives of the indirect utility function (described in Table
A1) into (21), use that tj = 0 in first-best, that the aggregate disposable income in j, Y
disp
j , is given by
Nj
∫
y
(y + r(y)− Tj − pjβj − βx) aj(y)f(y)dy, and solve this expression for gj . To calculate the corresponding
efficient production of the publicly provided good, solve (2) for Gj and plug in the previous expression for gj .
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We chose to use an abstract model economy, since calibration of any kind would imply
that only a narrow range of combinations of ρ and σ could be used to describe the observed
situation. Thus, our setup allows us to assess the welfare consequences of decentralized pro-
vision for different characteristics of the publicly provided good, and it eases calculation and
the representation of results. Another issue of a calibrated model would be to cope with the
progressive nature of income taxation.
There are J = 2 municipalities in our model economy. Household income is uniformly
distributed between y = 1 and y = 2. We further assume that households have access to the
other municipality’s public provision to the same degree as there are spillovers; i.e., we set
ν = σ. Aggregate land is normalized to 1, and both municipalities are of equal size. Since
municipalities do not differ ex ante, we can assume without loss of generality that municipality
1 is inhabited by the poor and municipality 2 by the rich households. Thus, y˜1,2 = y1 = y2 is
the indifferent household.
Table 1: Parameter values for the baseline calibration.
Parameter α βx βh βg γ ν θ L1 y y
Value 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.1 σ 3 0.5 1 2
Definition of parameters. α: preference for publicly provided good; βx: subsistence level (SL) of the numeraire;
βh: SL of housing; βg: SL of the publicly provided good; γ: housing preference; ν: neighborhood parameter
(access to publicly provided good in the other municipality), set to equal σ; θ: price elasticity of housing supply;
L1: (relative) land size of municipality 1 (L2 = 1−L1); y: lower bound of income distribution; y: upper bound
of income distribution.
The values of the remaining parameters are given in Table 1. The parameters are set
such that the subsistence levels account for 40% of the poorest household’s income if the
housing prices were 1 (the price of the numeraire good is unity by construction). We choose
moderate levels of the relative preference parameters for the publicly provided good and housing
(α = 0.2 and γ = 0.1, respectively), which implies that households optimally spend most of
their disposable income on the numeraire good. θ = 3 is a common value of the housing price
elasticity (see e.g. Schmidheiny 2006b). In section 4.3, we discuss a series of sensitivity checks
in which we vary these parameters by 20% in each direction.
Figure 1 shows the indifferent border-household y˜1,2 as a function of σ and ρ. With a uniform
distribution of income, the population share is given by the difference between y˜1,2 and y = 1
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Figure 1: Border household in the decentralized equilibrium, for various combinations of
spillovers (σ) and congestion (ρ).
and y = 2 for municipality 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 2 shows the resulting housing prices,
tax rates, public production and public consumption. Equilibrium values for specific values of
σ and ρ are given in Table A3 in the Appendix. For the special case of a publicly provided
private good, the poorest 30% of the population live in municipality 1, whereas the richest
70% of the population reside in municipality 2. The rich municipality exhibits higher public
consumption in exchange for a higher housing price and higher income taxes.25
In general, decreasing the degree of congestion leads to a more uneven distribution of the
population among municipalities due to economies of scale. Intuitively, with a low degree of
rivalry, the increasing returns to scale from public provision dominate the moving decision,
since a larger tax base translates into a higher consumption level for all residents.26
An increase in spillovers results in a more equal distribution of the population (Figure
1) and to a convergence in public production and consumption (bottom panels in Figure 2).
Housing prices are higher in the rich municipality for spillover levels of up to approximately
25Since municipalities differ along three dimensions, there are three different possible trade-offs that may
emerge: (i) Higher level of public provision in exchange for a higher housing price and higher taxes; (ii) a
lower housing price in exchange for higher taxes and a lower level of public provision; and (iii) lower taxes in
exchange for a higher housing price and a lower level of public provision. Our findings for the publicly provided
private good are consistent with the results in Schmidheiny (2006b), but as is evident from Figure 2, this is not
a general result.
26Consider combinations of σ = 0 and ρ < 1, which correspond to the surface in front and to the right in
Figure 1. If rivalry in consumption is low enough (in our case approximately 0.65), households choose to reside
in only one municipality, leaving the other empty.
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Figure 2: Municipality characteristics in the decentralized equilibrium, for various combinations
of spillovers (σ) and rivalry in consumption (ρ): Housing price pj, tax rate tj, production Gj,
and consumption gj.
0.5, whereas for larger levels, prices are higher in the poor municipality. Income tax rates,
however, are higher in the rich municipality for all combinations of spillovers and congestion.
There is a range of parameter combinations for which the tax rate in the poor municipality
is zero, but the municipality is not empty. In these cases, the poor municipality completely
free-rides on the public provision of the rich municipality.
We find no stable equilibria if spillovers are high and/or congestion is low enough, and we
are not able to identify income separating equilibria for σ ≥ 0.8 independent of the value of
ρ. Intuitively, high spillovers and low levels of congestion reduce the degree of tax competition
in the sense that the income differences between municipalities become less pronounced. For
suffciently large spillovers, the equilibrium is no longer characterized by income segregation.
4 Welfare analysis
Because we abstract from the benefits of decentralization (by imposing complete information
and abstracting from rent-seeking activities), decentralizing public provision leads to a welfare
loss by construction in our model. In this section, we decompose this welfare loss into inefficient
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redistribution, the inefficient choice of tax rates, and the inefficient choice of residence. We
further illustrate how the individual components depend on spillovers and congestion.
Our efficiency benchmark is based on the theoretical model described in Section 2.2. The
planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function (SWF) with welfare weights for all
households set to unity. We restrict our attention to income-segregating equilibria.27 Our
approach differs from Calabrese et al. (2012), who choose the weights of their welfare function
implicitly such that the individual transfers are optimally zero. Their implicit SWF places
substantially more weight on the rich than on the poor.
To match our model with reality where governments usually cannot enforce transfers from
or to the landlords, we choose ωR such that R=0 is optimal for the ‘semi-public’ good case of
σ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5.28 To find the global maximum, we use a grid search over y˜1,2 (thereafter
yborder for the two-municipality-case) to determine the border household. Our analysis reveals
that for almost all combinations of σ and ρ there are three saddle points that comply with the
first-order conditions derived in Section 2.2: A welfare minimum, one local welfare maximum,
and one global maximum. The shape of the SWF for varying levels of yborder, σ and ρ is
displayed in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
4.1 Welfare loss from decentralization
Figure 3 shows the difference between the value of the SWF in the first-best equilibrium and
in the fully decentralized equilibrium, for different combinations of σ and ρ. The welfare
loss from decentralization increases with the degree of spillovers and decreases with rivalry
in consumption over much of the parameter space, and it has a maximum for a combination
of intermediate levels of spillovers and low rivalry in consumption. The underlying reason for
these relationships is that making the good more public in nature leads to a mechanical increase
in welfare due to greater benefits associated with a unit of the public good, but also to a greater
scope for inefficiency from decentralization due to inter-municipal free-riding (spillovers) and
an inefficient allocation of the population (rivalry).
27This implies that the distribution of households boils down to a one-dimensional decision for the planner:
By determining the border household, all poorer (richer) households are located in municipality 1 (2). Formally,
a1(y) = 1 ∀ y < yborder and a2(y) = 1 ∀ y > yborder, whereas all other values of a are zero.
28Given our parameter choices, this results in ωR = 0.444 . Note that given our parameters, the housing
rents are relatively small, such that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of ωR.
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Figure 3: Difference in the value of the Social Welfare Function (SWF) between the first-best
equilibrium (FB) and the fully decentralized equilibrium (SB), as a function of σ and ρ.
For combinations of ρ sufficiently small and σ sufficiently large, we could not establish decentralized equilibria
that comply with segregation by income.
The figure suggests that the welfare loss from decentralization is highest for a combination
of low rivalry and intermediate spillovers. For these parameter combinations, it is optimal to
leave one municipality almost empty (for details, refer to Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix).
This is the result of two opposing forces: On the one hand, spillovers provide incentives for the
poor to free-ride on the public good provision (and thus implicitly on the tax payments) of the
rich municipality. On the other hand, imperfect rivalry implies economies of scale such that
the poor households can profit from the rich municipality’s payments by residing in the latter’s
municipality. As it turns out, the latter effect dominates for intermediate levels of spillovers.
In contrast, the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by pronounced income segregation.
To obtain an ordinal measure of the welfare loss, we compute households’ compensating
variation (CV), which we define as the income that a household needs to receive in the second-
best equilibrium to maintain its first-best utility level.29 Households with a positive CV are
better off in the first-best equilibrium, whereas those with a negative CV are better off in
the decentralized equilibrium. The aggregate monetized welfare loss of decentralization is the
integral of the households’ compensating variations (CV agg). A quantification of the welfare
loss from decentralization according to this measure is given by Figure A3 in the Appendix.
To gain more intuition about the costs of decentralization, we focus on the case of a ‘semi-
29Formally, CV (y) solves V SB(pSBj , t
SB
j , g
SB
j ; [y + CV (y)]) = V
FB(pFBj , T
FB
j , t
FB
j , g
FB
j ; y).
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Table 2: First-best vs. decentralized eqilibrium: The case of a ‘semi-public’ good.
First-best Decentralized
Municipality characteristics Municipality Municipality
1 2 1 2
Income tax rate tj 0 0 0.086 0.147
Uniform lump-sum tax Tj 0.000 0.290 — —
Public consumption gj 0.105 0.250 0.114 0.185
Housing price pj 0.516 0.825 0.680 0.759
Border household yborder 1.200 1.457
Household characteristics
rpoorest -0.157
Individual transfer rmedian 0.173 —
rrichest -0.327
ydisppoorest 0.539 0.578
Disposable income ydispmedian 1.018 0.929
ydisprichest 1.018 1.356
V (y)poorest 0.307 0.321
Utility V (y)median 0.580 0.512
V (y)richest 0.580 0.693
Welfare measures
Value of Social Welfare Function 0.553 0.541
CV agg in % of total income 2.238
Results are for σ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5. Households are uniformly distributed between y = 1 and y = 2. Integrals
are approximated by modeling 101 household types with income y = 1, 1.01, 1.02, . . . , 2.
public’ good characterized by σ = ν = 0.3, ρ = 0.5.30 The corresponding municipality and
household characteristics of the first- and second-best equilibria are presented in Table 2.31
The decentralized equilibrium is associated with an aggregate monetized welfare loss equal
to more than 2.2% of total income, substantially more than in the case of the publicly provided
private good. In the decentralized solution, the border household is y = 1.457, which means
that the poorest 45.7% of the population self-select into municipality 1, whereas the richer
households choose to live in municipality 2. The social planner distributes households into an
even more populated rich and an even less populated poor municipality.
Figure 4 shows individualized transfers, disposable income, utility levels and the CV as
30For the calibrated model of Kuhlmey (2017), which is an adjusted version of the current model, it is
assumed that the “set of spillover-generating expenditure categories consist of health, culture and leisure,
security, environment, and traffic”. Using this categorization, the suburban municipalities in the metropolitan
area around Zurich (Switzerland) spend around 25% of their budget on goods or services associated with a high
degree of spillovers.
31The corresponding case of a publicly provided private good is shown in Table A2 and Figure A4. This has
been the focus of the previous literature.
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Figure 4: Household characteristic in FB and the fully decentralized equilibrium for the ‘semi-
public’ good (σ = 0.3, ρ = 0.5): Individual transfer scheme r(y), disposable income ydisp(y),
utility level V (y), and compensating variation CV (y).
a function of income. The planner imposes a municipality-specific linear transfer scheme, in
which the inhabitants of the poor municipality, along with the richest households in the rich
municipality, pay to subsidize the poorer inhabitants of the rich municipality (upper left panel).
Within each municipality, after taxes and transfers, everybody is equally well off (lower left
panel). In contrast, the utility level in the decentralized equilibrium is monotonically increasing
in y. Due to the lower housing price in the less crowded municipality, the poor households’
utility is relatively close to their second-best values, whereas the poorer households in the rich
municipality are substantially better off. Thus, the social planner improves the outcome for
middle-income households at the expense of the poor and the rich. The corresponding CV
mirrors this result. This result is due to the application of a utilitarian welfare function. In
general, the social planner increases aggregate welfare relative to the decentralized solution by
redistributing utility from some households to others. The exact pattern of this redistribution
depends on the weights of the social welfare function. Calabrese et al. (2012) use implicit
welfare weights that lead to zero redistribution. These welfare weights are regressive in that
they are lower for the poor than they are for the rich households. Our finding that the rich
households are better off in the competitive decentralized equilibrium in consistent with the
results in Bucovetsky & Glazer (2014).
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4.2 Decomposition of the welfare loss
The total welfare loss associated with decentralization is the combination of the following setup
in the decentralized equilibrium: Imperfect tax instruments, a decentralized tax setting, and
free mobility. To quantify the relative size of these different inefficiencies, we design different
versions of the model, in which we impose increasingly tighter restrictions on the instruments
available to the social planner. Among the several possibilities to do this, we choose a sequence
that we believe is intuitive. Note further that the intermediate steps are conceptual in nature
and do not describe a realistic policy scenario. We choose the same example of a “semi-public”
good considered above, where σ and ρ are fixed at 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. The resulting
equilibria are described in Table 3.
Table 3: Decomposition of the welfare loss from decentralization.
First-best I II Fully decent.
r(y) = T = 0 (I) & voting (II) & mobility
Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Income tax rate tj 0 0 0.000 0.175 0.006 0.156 0.086 0.147
Uniform lump-sum tax Tj 0.000 0.290 — — — — — —
Public consumption gj 0.105 0.250 0.105 0.244 0.081 0.206 0.114 0.185
Housing price pj 0.516 0.825 0.526 0.824 0.597 0.801 0.680 0.749
Border household yborder 1.200 1.180 1.280 1.457
Value of SWF 0.5526 0.5498 0.5456 0.5405
CV agg (in % of total income) 2.238 1.394 0.711
Relative size of welfare loss 37.7% 30.5% 31.8%
Imperfect Inter-municipal Jurisdictional
redistribution free-riding choice externality
Results are for σ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5. Households are uniformly distributed between y = 1 and y = 2. Integrals
are approximated by modeling 101 household types with income y = 1, 1.01, 1.02, . . . , 2.
In step I, we set r(y) = 0 and Tj = 0, thus restricting the social planner’s ability to redis-
tribute to linear income taxation. Since households living in the same municipality consume
the same amount of the public good but pay different taxes, redistribution takes place in the
form of public provision financed predominantly by the rich. The level of public provision
(and thus the income tax rates), and also the distribution of households across municipalities
remains determined by the social planner.32 The welfare loss resulting from eliminating inter-
32In principle, one could separate this step into one step where lump-sum taxes are ruled out but head taxes
are still allowed, and a second step where head taxes are removed from the set of available policy instrument.
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municipal redistribution amounts to 2.238 − 1.394 = 0.84% of total income, which is roughly
a third of the total welfare loss from decentralization for the given parameters.
In step II, the municipalities are allowed to choose their own income tax rates and thus their
level of public provision by majority vote, such that the role of the social planner is reduced
to allocating the population across municipalities. This step introduces inter-municipal free-
riding: Because some of the local public production is consumed in the other municipality, the
utility-maximizing median voter does not consider the full benefits associated with his choice
of local income taxes, and will thus choose a tax rate that is below the social optimum. At the
same time, he or she free-rides on the public provision from outside the municipality borders.
The levels of public consumption significantly drop in both municipalities. The inefficiency due
to inter-municipal free-riding accounts for roughly another third of the total overall welfare loss.
Also included in moving from step I to step II is the inefficiency that results from voting per
se. In an attempt to isolate the voting inefficiency, we have introduced local social planners in
both municipalities. These take the household distribution and the majority-voting outcome
in the other municipality as given by version II, but choose the socially optimal level of the tax
rate, accounting for the municipality-specific dynamics (such as the adjustment of the housing
prices). Due to the concavity of the utility function, the planners place a larger weight on
poorer households than the median voter, which leads to a marginally higher tax rate (which
is the sole means of redistribution at this stage of the model). The resulting difference in the
compensating variation relative to the fully decentralized equilibrium with majority voting is
marginal, implying that the voting inefficiency is not a major source of welfare loss in our setup
(Table A5 in the Appendix gives the details).33
Finally, letting households self-select into municipalities leads to the fully decentralized so-
lution discussed above. This last step captures the JCE, conditional on the equilibrium at step
II: When selecting their preferred municipality, households do not consider the fiscal burden
they impose on other municipality members via income tax payments, public consumption, and
However, given that income is fixed in our model, income taxation does not entail a deadweight loss in terms of
factor supply and is thus not qualitatively different to a specific combination of a lump-sum tax with a linear
income tax. For this reason, we chose to combine the removal of r(y) and Tj into a single ‘redistribution’ step.
33Alternatively, one could try to isolate the inefficiency from voting by comparing the first-best situation,
where all decisions are made by a social planner, with a model where the decisions are made by a central
median voter. However, this is complicated by the presence of spillovers and congestion. A uniform public
consumption, which could serve as a benchmark for the decentralized outcome, is only consistent with zero or
perfect spillovers. If spillovers are imperfect, the location of the central median voter would matter.
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Figure 5: Utility as a function of income (σ = 0.3, ρ = 0.5).
the housing market. The result is an inefficient population distribution, which is responsible
for the remaining third of the overall welfare loss in our baseline case.
Figure 5 displays the household-specific utility levels and thus identifies the winners and
losers of each decentralization step. The utility levels in the first-best (black) and the decen-
tralized (grey) equilibria correspond to those in the bottom left graph of Figure 4 and show
that decentralization implies an increase in utility for the rich and the poor, at the expense
of households in the middle-income range. The utility levels of these households (those with
income between 1.2 and 1.7) are close to their second-best utility level at decentralization step
I. Inefficient public provision due to inter-municipal free-riding (I to II) mainly hurts the poor,
for whom public consumption constitutes a larger share of total consumption. In the last step,
the JCE reduces the utility of the poorest third of the population, while making the remainder
of the population marginally better off.
We now investigate to what extent these results depend on the level of spillovers and
congestion. Figure 6 shows the welfare loss at different decentralization steps for ρ = 0.5,
computed for the range of different values for σ, in terms of the welfare function (top panel)
and the aggregate CV relative to the fully decentralized equilibrium (bottom panel). Social
welfare is increasing in σ for all equilibria that are not fully decentralized, due to the larger
benefits associated with producing a unit of the public good. The inefficiencies associated
with imperfect redistribution, spillovers and the locational choice of households turn out to
neutralize this mechanical welfare increase almost completely, such that the SWF of the fully
decentralized equilibrium is relatively insensitive to the value of σ.
The welfare loss from restricting the available policy instruments to nonbenefit taxation is
represented by the difference between the solid and dotted lines. This inefficiency decreases
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the welfare loss for varying σ (ρ = 0.5): Value of the social welfare
function (SWF) and aggregate compensating variation (CV agg) in % of total income.
with the strength of spillovers.34 As municipal boundaries become more porous, the income
spent on public production increasingly reaches the population in other municipalities, thus
providing an alternative pathway for redistribution. In our model, it is the rich municipality
that produces more of the public good, such that spillovers effectively redisribute from rich to
poor, as would be the case with individualized head taxes. This result is qualitatively similar
to the model by Wellisch (1994) in the sense that spillovers can serve a substitute for monetary
payments and thus reduce regional welfare differentials.
The welfare loss due to inter-municipal free-riding is captured by the difference between
decentralization steps I and II. The median voter in each municipality has no incentive to
consider the benefit of local public production that accrues elsewhere. As spillvers increase,
this inefficiency naturally becomes more important.
34The relative welfare losses due to the inter-municipal free-riding and the JCE are qualitatively similar
when measured with the SWF or the CV. However, not having access to individualized transfers (the difference
between first-best and step I in Figure 6) has a much larger welfare effect in terms of the CV than in terms
of the value of the SWF. The underlying reason is that the CV for a given change in utility depends on a
household’s income level. The non-monotonicity of the solid line in the bottom panel in Figure 6 is due to
different households being expropriated by the social planner, due to very different population distributions at
low levels of σ
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Figure 7: Decomposition of the welfare loss for varying σ (ρ = 0.5): Border household yborder
and population-weighted public consumption g ≡∑j Njgj., relative to first-best levels.
The welfare loss from the JCE is non-monotonic in σ.35 It is the difference between the
lines associated with step II and the fully decentralized equilibrium in the top panel, and its
monetized version is given by line (II) in the bottom panel. The underlying reason is the pop-
ulation distribution, which is shown in the top panel of Figure 7. Without spillovers, the entire
population resides in municipality 2 in all steps of decentralization, due to the considerable
economies of scale reflected by ρ = 0.5 that underlies this figure. As spillovers increase, mu-
nicipality 1 is gradually populated, but at different rates across the different decentralization
steps. In particular, households leave municipality 2 at a “faster” pace in the fully decentral-
ized equilibrium, relative to step II, which leads to an increase in the welfare loss due to the
JCE.36 However, unlike the “poor chase rich” result identified in the previous literature, it is
the poor community that is inefficiently crowded. The inefficiency from this “poor flee rich”
effect stems from the fact that the households that move to municipality 1 free-ride on the
public production in municipality 2 (and enjoy low housing prices), without contributing much
35We stress that this is the welfare loss from the JCE (which is one number and positive by construction),
not the JCE itself (which depends on the municipality and the income level of the involved household, and
which can be positive or negative).
36Recall that these are equilibrium outcomes, such that by “faster” we mean a higher correlation between σ
and the income of the equilibrium border household at low levels of spillovers.
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to the public good themselves, even though a larger public production in municipality 2 would
be preferrable from a social point of view. As a result, the average public consumption decrases
(bottom panel of Figure 7), and the welfare loss from the JCE increases.
Once spillovers become sufficiently strong, the population distribution and the average
public consumption level become increasingly similar in step II and the decentralized equilib-
rium (and the same is true for tax rates and housing prices). This reduces the dependency
of households’ utility on the locational choice, and thus the inefficiency that can arise from a
decentralized allocation of the population. As a consequence, the welfare loss from the JCE
declines with σ. This effect at high levels of spillovers is qualitatively similar to findings from
tax competition models, where spillovers mitigate the inefficiency from not considering the
benefits of the outflow of the tax base that accrues in other regions as some of this tax base
“spills back” (Bloch & Zenginobuz 2015, Armbruster & Hintermann 2018).
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Figure 8: Jurisdictional choice externality as a function of spillovers and congestion
The relationship between spillovers and the the welfare loss from the JCE depends on the
level of the assumed congestion, especially at low levels of σ. Figure 8 shows the JCE in
terms of the aggregated compensating variation relative to the decentralized equilibrium for all
combinations of σ and ρ. The figure suggests that the case of ρ = 0.5 (the blue dashed line in
the bottom panel of Figure 6) is somewhat special, as for lower and higher levels of congestion,
the welfare loss is first decreasing in σ, before increasing and finally decreasing at sufficiently
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Figure 9: Difference in incomes of border household in step II and the decentralized equilibrium.
Positive values imply relative crowding of the rich municipality (“poor chase rich”), whereas negative values
mean that fewer households live in the rich municipality than what would be socially optimal (“poor flee rich”).
high levels of spillovers.
The key to understanding this additional non-monotonicity at low levels of σ is once again
the population distribution. Figure 9 shows the difference between the income of the border
household in step II and the decentralized equilibrium for all values of σ and ρ. A positive
difference implies that the share of the population living in the rich municipality is larger in
the decentralized equilibrium than in step II (where the population is assigned by the social
planner). This corresponds to “poor chase rich”, where poor households move into the rich
municipality in order to benefit from the tax payments of high-income households. This is the
case for σ/ρ combinations close to the publicly provided private good, and also for combinations
of low σ/low ρ (but not for ρ = 0.5, and thus it cannot be seen in Figures 6-7).
Consider the case of a publicly provided private good (σ = 0, ρ = 1), which is associated
with a strong over-crowding of the rich community. Introducing positive levels of spillovers
mitigates the “poor chase rich” effect, because public consumption increases in the poor com-
munity, and as a consequence, the poor’s incentive to crowd into the rich municipality is
reduced. As spillovers increase, the population distribution in the decentralized equilibrium
reaches a point where it is exactly efficient (the intersection between the curved surface and
the zero-surface in Fig. 9), such that the welfare loss from the JCE is zero. This explains the
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initial decease of the welfare loss as a function of σ in Figure 8, for low and high levels of ρ.
If spillovers increase further, the population distribution switches to “poor flee rich” dis-
cussed in the context of Figures 6-7. For high levels of σ, the poor community is sufficiently
attractive to drive housing prices to above those in the rich municipality (Figure 2). If spillovers
increase even more, the characteristics of the municipalities converge and the welfare loss of
the JCE decreases, as discussed above.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to the following key
parameters: The elasticity of the housing supply, the preference parameters for housing and
the publicly provided good, and the subsistence levels for the numeraire good and for housing.
Starting with the baseline results from Table 3, we apply variations in one parameter while
holding the others fixed. Table 4 shows a summary of the resulting welfare loss in terms of the
compensating variation (CV) and its distribution across the decentralization steps. Equilibrium
values of the border household, aggregate community income, housing prices, tax rates and
public production at each step are provided in Table A6 in the Appendix.
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis: Decomposition of the welfare loss in terms of the aggregated
compensating variation (in % of GDP), for σ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5.
Decomposition of the WL
CV agg Redistribution Free-riding JCE
Baseline 2.26 38.3 30.2 31.5
θ = 1.5 1.80 49.2 30.2 20.5
θ = 3.5 1.80 32.6 35.1 32.2
α low 1.65 39.9 29.3 30.7
α high 2.85 38.3 31.4 30.4
γ low 2.33 38.4 30.7 30.8
γ high 2.18 38.3 30.1 31.6
βx low 2.29 37.5 29.9 32.5
βx high 2.21 39.0 28.5 32.5
βh low 2.40 33.4 34.7 32.0
βh high 2.12 43.9 26.5 29.6
Note: “high” and “low” refer to 20% above and 20% below the respective baseline value. For the definition of
the parameters, refer to Table 1.
The results change in an intuitive way for all parameter perturbations. For example, an
increase in the preference for housing (γ) implies an increase in housing prices. Higher sub-
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sistence levels for x and h lead to a decrease in disposable income, which in turn results in a
lower welfare loss from decentralization, because there is less scope for a strategic substitution
between private and public consumption. At the same time, the relative contribution of imper-
fect redistribution is somewhat larger because households are more income-constrained. The
welfare loss from free-riding is more pronounced if we assume a higher level of the preference
parameter for the publicly provided good (α), and it is less relevant for lower levels of α.
The comparison of the border household in step II with that in the fully decentralized
equilibrium reveals that the “poor flee rich” result from our baseline is robust to all parameter
variations with the exception of an increase in the price elasticity of the housing supply. With
θ = 3.5 (instead of 3), housing becomes cheaper, such that it becomes attractive for the poor
to completely ‘chase’ the rich, thereby leaving the poor municipality empty (recall that these
model runs are based on ρ = 0.5, which implies significant economies of scale in the production
of the public good). For this model run, the relative welfare loss from the JCE is slightly higher
(32.2% instead of 31.5%), but the absolute welfare loss is smaller (0.58% of GDP vs. 0.71 %),
which is due to the lowr cost of housing.
Table A6 also reports equilibrium values for changes of the welfare function (SWF): Instead
of equal welfare weights as applied by a utilitarian social planner, we apply welfare weights
that are increasing or decreasing in income. We have assumed rather strong changes, with the
welfare weights either increasing from 1 to 101 or decreasing from 101 to 1. In both cases,
the aggregate welfare loss from decentralization is larger, with 6% and 13.5% for increasing
and decreasing weights, respectively. Intuitively, the part of the population with the lower
welfare weights is kept near its subsistence level by the social planner, whereas the share of
the population with the highest welfare weights is much better off in first-best relative to the
decentralized case (where no SWF is applied). The CV for decreasing welfare weights is more
than twice as high than the CV for increasing weights. The reason is that in the former case, it
is the rich who require compensation (which translates to a large monetary compensation due
to their low marginal utility of income), whereas the latter case the poor are compensated.37
37The different tradeoff between utility and money for households of different income levels is the reason why
the aggregate compensating variation turns negative for decentralization steps I and II. The respective level of
the SWF, which is the relevant measure from the perspective of the social planner, is higher at each step of
decentralization than in the fully decentralized equilibrum.
37
5 Conclusions
We extend a model of tax-induced Tiebout sorting by allowing for interjurisdictional spillovers
and imperfect congestion of the publicly provided good. The presence of spillovers or imperfect
rivalry in consumption introduces additional terms to the equilibrium conditions, which render
the utility of households in all municipalities a function of the public production in all other
municipalities. We derive a modified Samuelson rule for decentralized public production in
the presence of spillovers and imperfect congestion, and also highlight the inefficiency arising
from households’ decentralized choice of residence. This jurisdictional choice externality is the
consequence of households not considering their fiscal impact on others, both in their residence
of choice (via congestion) and in other municipalities (via spillovers).
We implement our model numerically for all meaningful values for spillovers and congestion.
We find that an increase in spillovers leads to a reduction in the difference between the mu-
nicipalities with respect to income levels, tax rates, and the consumption levels of the publicly
provided good. If spillovers are sufficiently large, income tax competition breaks down in the
sense that households no longer segregate by income.
We separate the welfare cost of moving from a unified model, in which a social planner
makes all decisions, to a fully decentralized equilibrium where households are mobile and
where the median voter decides on the level of tax rates (and thus public production), into three
categories: (1) imperfect redistribution, (2) inter-municipal freeriding and (3) the jurisdictional
choice externality. We find that the attributes of the publicly provided private good affect the
composition of the welfare loss in important ways. The higher the level of spillovers, the higher
the inefficiency due to free-riding, which is intuitive, and the lower is the inefficiency due to
constrained redistribution. This implies that spillovers constitute an alternative pathway for
redistribution, which is qualitatively similar to results derived using models in the context of
head taxes (e.g., Wellisch 1993).
Perhaps most interestingly, spillovers affect the inefficiency due to the JCE in a non-
monotonic way. If spillovers increase from zero, the result of the decentralized locational
choice switches from crowding of the rich community to crowding of the poor community, be-
fore becoming close to efficient at high levels of spillovers. This translates to a welfare loss
that is first decreasing, then increasing, and then again decreasing in σ. The “poor flee rich”
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effect that we identify is new to the literature, and due to the fact that spillovers allow poor
households to free-ride on the public production in the rich municipality while enjoying low
tax rates and housing prices. Allowing for a more general definition of the public good thus
leads to qualitatively different implications of decentralization in terms of household sorting.
Our results for large levels of spillovers are similar in spirit to findings in capital tax com-
petition models, where spillovers reduce the inefficiency of tax competition, because a part of
the capital that flows to other region “spills back” (Ogawa & Wildasin 2009, Eichner & Runkel
2012). The technical inefficiency thus mitigates the fiscal inefficiency from the decentralized
setting of tax rates in the presence of a mobile tax base.
Although our stylized model does not allow us to derive specific policy implications, our
results suggest that in the presence of exogenous jurisdictional borders, there is no simple
allocation rule to determine what kinds of goods and services should be provided at the different
levels of government, but that this crucially depends on their degree of rivalry in consumption
and the strength of interregional spillovers.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to more realistic distributions of income, to
progressive taxation, to jurisdictions of different sizes, or to allow for spillovers to be asymmetric
between municipalities. Also, in order to bring the model closer to reality, it would make sense
to add a vertical dimension of the federal system by introducing a central authority with access
to some redistributive grants or another means of fiscal equalization.
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Appendix
A1: Proof that η = 0 in first-best
This proof is an adjusted version of Proposition 3 in Calabrese et al. (2012). In the first-best
environment where the social planner has access to individualized transfers, ηj = 0 for any
combination of welfare weights. To show this, note that for income-segregated equilibria (on
which we concentrate), the summation terms in (14) can be dropped because ai = 0 for all
municipalities other than municipality j, which contains the income level y:
ω(y)V jy (y) + ηjh
j
y(y) = ωR (A1)
Multiplying both sides by hj(y)aj(y), integrating over the support of the income distribution
and substituting housing market clearance leads to
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jy (y)h
j(y)aj(y)f(y)dy + ηj
∫ y
y
hjy(y)h
j(y)aj(y)f(y)dy = ωRH
S(pj).
Substituting this into (17), dropping y as an argument and rearranging terms gives
∫ y
y
ω
[
V jp + V
j
y h
j
]
ajfdy = −ηj
(∫ y
y
[
hjp + h
j
yh
j
]
ajfdy −HSp (pj)
)
. (A2)
The LHS is zero by Roy’s identity. The parenthesis on the RHS consists of the slope of the
compensated demand function (averaged over all households), minus the slope of the supply
function for housing, and is thus negative. In order for the equation to hold, ηj therefore has
to be zero. 
A2: Proof of Proposition 1
For the special case of a publicly provided private good, substitute ρ = 1, ν = σ = 0 and
gj = (tjYj +NjTj)/Nj into (19) to get
JCEj(y)
∣∣
σ=ν=0,ρ=1
= λjtj
(
y − Yj/Nj
)
+ ηjh
j(y). (A3)
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Setting tj = ηj = 0 immediately leads to part (i). For part (ii), substituting tj = ηj = 0 back
into (19) leads to
JCEj(y)
∣∣
tj=ηj=0
=
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)
Tj
− ρ
(
λj
TjNj + σ
∑
i 6=j TiNi
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
+ σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
TiNi + σ
∑
k 6=i TkNk
Ni + ν
∑
k 6=iNk
)
(A4)
Note that without income taxes, the JCE no longer depends on the income level of the household
that is added to municipality j. If ρ is sufficiently small relative to σ, the first part dominates
and the JCE is positive, and vice versa. For part (iii), substitute Tj = 0 into (19) and take the
derivative with respect to income to get
∂JCEj(y)
∂y
=
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi
)
tj + ηj
∂hj(y)
∂y
(A5)
The first term is positive (note that the congestion-related part is independent of income and
therefore drops out). The second term is negative only for ηj < 0, which, as discussed above,
is the case if the welfare weight placed on the absentee landlords is sufficiently small. Provided
that the second effect does not eliminate the first, the JCE increases in income. Part (iv):
Suppose that this were not the case, such that JCEj(y˜j,j+1) > JCEj+1(y˜j,j+1). It would then
be possible to reallocate a measure of households in the interval y ∈ (y˜j,j+1, y˜j,j+1 + ), where
 is small, from municipality j + 1 to municipality j and thereby increase social welfare. This
is impossibly by the definition of a social optimum. 
A3: Proof of Proposition 2
For income-segregated equilibria, (14) can be written without summations terms:
ω(y)V jy (y) + ηjh
j
y(y) = ωR.
Multiplying by aj(y) and integrating over the support of y on both sides leads to
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jy (y)ajf(y)dy + ηj
∫ y
y
hjy(y)ajf(y)dy = ωRNj. (A6)
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Substituting this expression into (15) while recognizing that VT (1− tj) = −Vy and hT (1− tj) =
−hy, and simplifying leads to
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j
λi =
ωR
1− tj . (A7)
This expression holds for all j and can be solved for38
λj =
ωR
(1 + σ(J − 1)) (1− σ)
(
1 + σ(J − 2)
1− tj − σ
∑
i 6=j
1
1− ti
)
. (A8)
Substituting (A8) into (18), finally, leads to the following optimality condition:
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)aj(y)f(y)dy =
ωR
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
(1 + σ(J − 1)) (1− σ)
(
1 + σ(J − 2)
1− tj − σ
∑
i 6=j
1
1− ti
)
− ηj
∫ y
y
hjg(y)aj(y)f(y)dy. (A9)
This is a generalized Samuelson condition that defines the efficient production (and con-
sumption) level of the publicly provided good, accounting for imperfect congestion and spillovers.
It states that the aggregate social marginal utility from an additional unit of gj (left-hand side)
needs to be equal to the sum of total fiscal costs (conditional on the degree of spillovers and
congestion) and the inefficiency due to a suboptimal distribution of the population.
To prove Part (i), recall that in the first-best case, ηj = tj = 0. Divide the LHS of (A9) by∫ y
y
ω(y)V jy (y)aj(y)f(y)dy, and the RHS by ωRNj, which by (A6) are equal, and use (22):
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)aj(y)f(y)dy∫ y
y
ω(y)V jy (y)aj(y)f(y)dy
=
λ
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
ωRNj
. (A10)
From (14), it follows that ω(y)V jy (y) = ωR. Because this is a constant for all y, we can take it
inside the integral in the numerator of the LHS and cancel the welfare terms:
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)
ωR
aj(y)f(y)dy∫ y
y
ajf(y)dy
=
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)
ω(y)V jy (y)
aj(y)f(y)dy
Nj
=
∫ y
y
V jg (y)
V jy (y)
aj(y)f(y)dy
Nj
(A11)
38To arrive at (A8), set up the system of equations of (A7) for J = 2, 3, . . . and solve it manually. This
reveals the general formula.
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Setting this equal to the RHS in (A10) and multiplying by Nj leads to (21).
Part (ii) of the proposition follows directly from substituting tj = 0 into (A8). 
A4: Additional tables and figures
Table A1: First-best efficiency conditions for the given functional forms.
Choice
Efficiency conditions
variables
tj 0 =
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jt (y)ajf(y)dy + ηj
∫ y
y
hjt (y)ajf(y)dy + Yj
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j λi
)
Tj 0 =
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jT (y)ajf(y)dy + ηj
∫ y
y
hjT (y)ajf(y)dy +Nj
(
λj + σ
∑
i 6=j λi
)
pj 0 =
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jp (y)ajf(y)dy + ηj
( ∫ y
y
hjp(y)ajf(y)dy −HSp (pj)
)
+ ωRH
S(pj)
gj 0 =
∫ y
y
ω(y)V jg (y)ajf(y)dy + ηj
∫ y
y
hjg(y)ajf(y)dy − λj
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
r(y) 0 = ω(y)V jr (y)ajf(y) + ηjh
j
r(y)ajf(y) + Ω
R 0 = ωR + Ω
yborderi,j 0 = MSVi(y
border
i,j )−MSVj(yborderi,j )
Shadow
Feasibility constraints
variables
λj 0 = tjYj + TjNj + σ
∑
i 6=j(tiYi + TiNi)− gj ·
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
ηj 0 =
∫ y
y
hj(y)aj(y)f(y)dy −HS(pj)
Ω 0 = R+
∫ y
y
r(y)f(y)dy
First
Functional forms
derivatives
V jy 0 =
(1−α)(1−tj)
y(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx − V jy
V jt 0 = − (1−α)yy(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx − V
j
t
V jT 0 = − (1−α)y(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx − V
j
T
V jr 0 =
(1−α)
y(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx − V jr
V jp 0 = − (1−α)βhy(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−pjβh−βx −
γ
pj
− V jp
V jg 0 =
α
gj−βg − V jg
hjt 0 = − γy(1−α)pj − h
j
t
hjT 0 = − γ(1−α)pj − h
j
T
hjp 0 = −γ y(1−tj)+r(y)−Tj−βx(1−α)p2j − h
j
p
hjg 0 = h
j
g
hjr 0 =
γ
(1−α)pj − hjr
HSpj 0 = θLjp
θ−1
j −HSpj
Notes. HS(pj) = Ljp
θ
j and MSVj(y
border
i,j ) is given by (13) for y = y
border
i,j .
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Table A2: First-best vs. decentralized eqilibrium: Publicly provided private good.
First-best Decentralized
Municipality characteristics Municipality Municipality
1 2 1 2
Income tax rate tj 0 0 0.145 0.157
Uniform lump-sum tax Tj 0.225 0.239 — —
Public consumption gj 0.225 0.239 0.167 0.259
Housing price pj 0.712 0.713 0.593 0.796
Border household yborder 1.500 1.305
Household characteristics
rpoorest 0.467
Individual transfer rmedian -0.003 —
rrichest -0.466
ydisppoorest 0.900 0.537
Disposable income ydispmedian 0.952 0.906
ydisprichest 0.952 1.328
V (y)poorest 0.522 0.331
Utility V (y)median 0.522 0.534
V (y)richest 0.552 0.725
Welfare measures
Value of Social Welfare Function 0.5657 0.5607
CV agg in % of total income 0.725
Results are for σ = 0 and ρ = 1. Households are uniformly distributed between y = 1 and y = 2. Integrals are
approximated by modeling 101 household types with income y = 1, 1.01, 1.02, . . . , 2.
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Table A3: Decentralized equilibrium results for different values of σ and ρ.
j yj Yj pj tj Gj gj
σ = 0 ρ = 1
1 1.305 0.352 0.593 0.145 0.051 0.167
2 2 1.148 0.796 0.157 0.180 0.259
ρ ≤ 0.65 1 1 0 0.007 0.158 0 0.006
2 2 1.500 0.870 0.150 0.225 0.225
σ = 0.1 ρ = 1
1 1.369 0.437 0.632 0.115 0.050 0.154
2 2 1.063 0.777 0.154 0.164 0.253
ρ = 0.5
1 1.159 0.171 0.495 0.050 0.008 0.058
2 2 1.329 0.835 0.153 0.203 0.221
ρ = 0
1 1.022 0.022 0.285 0 0 0.022
2 2 1.478 0.865 0.151 0.224 0.224
σ = 0.3 ρ = 1
1 1.479 0.594 0.690 0.092 0.055 0.148
2 2 0.906 0.742 0.145 0.132 0.223
ρ = 0.5
1 1.457 0.561 0.680 0.086 0.048 0.114
2 2 0.939 0.749 0.147 0.138 0.185
ρ = 0
1 1.346 0.406 0.628 0.045 0.018 0.069
2 2 1.094 0.784 0.153 0.168 0.173
σ = 0.5 ρ = 1
1 1.555 0.709 0.724 0.088 0.062 0.146
2 2 0.791 0.715 0.130 0.103 0.185
ρ = 0.5
1 1.572 0.736 0.730 0.094 0.069 0.132
2 2 0.764 0.708 0.126 0.096 0.155
ρ = 0.15
1 1.592 0.768 0.738 0.101 0.077 0.125
2 2 0.732 0.700 0.120 0.088 0.133
ρ ≤ 0.1 No income separating equilibrium found.
σ = 0.7 ρ = 1
1 1.590 0.764 0.739 0.086 0.065 0.141
2 2 0.736 0.703 0.112 0.083 0.156
ρ = 0.6
1 1.595 0.772 0.740 0.088 0.068 0.134
2 2 0.728 0.701 0.110 0.080 0.144
ρ ≤ 0.55 No income separating equilibrium found.
σ = 0.78 ρ = 1
1 1.596 0.774 0.741 0.084 0.065 0.138
2 2 0.726 0.701 0.106 0.077 0.147
ρ ≤ 0.95 No income separating equilibrium found.
σ ≥ 0.8 No income separating equilibrium found.
Definition of parameters. σ: spillover parameter (0: no spillover, 1: perfect spillover); ρ: parameter for rivalry
in consumption (0: no rivalry, 1: perfect rivalry). Definition of variables. yj : highest income household in j
(municipality 1 has poor households and municipality 2 rich households; y1 = y2 is the indifferent household);
Yj : aggregate income; pj : housing price; tj : income tax rate; Gj : contribution to publicly provided good; gj :
consumption of publicly provided good.
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Table A4: First-best equilibrium results for different values of σ and ρ.
j yj Yj pj Tj gj
CV agg
(% of total income)
σ = 0 ρ = 1
1 1.5 0.625 0.712 0.225 0.225
0.725
2 2 0.875 0.713 0.239 0.239
ρ = 0.5
1 1.06 0.062 0.323 0 0.016
1.062
2 2 1.438 0.859 0.244 0.237
ρ = 0
1 1.02 0.02 0.235 0 0.005
0.457
2 2 1.48 0.866 0.233 0.229
σ = 0.1 ρ = 1
1 1.48 0.595 0.699 0.205 0.21
0.438
2 2 0.905 0.726 0.257 0.252
ρ = 0.5
1 1.12 0.127 0.42 0.051
0.739
2 2 1.373 0.847 0.262 0.244
ρ = 0
1 1.02 0.02 0.256 0 0.023
0.090
2 2 1.48 0.865 0.233 0.229
σ = 0.3 ρ = 1
1 1.34 0.398 0.601 0 0.13
1.387
2 2 1.102 0.79 0.354 0.307
ρ = 0.5
1 1.2 0.22 0.516 0 0.105
2.238
2 2 1.28 0.825 0.29 0.25
ρ = 0
1 1.02 0.02 0.289 0 0.069
3.978
2 2 1.48 0.864 0.233 0.229
σ = 0.5 ρ = 1
1 1.36 0.425 0.629 0 0.172
2.018
2 2 1.075 0.776 0.365 0.285
ρ = 0.5
1 1.28 0.319 0.584 0 0.146
2.470
2 2 1.181 0.8 0.324 0.251
ρ = 0
1 1.12 0.127 0.459 0 0.115
—
2 2 1.373 0.841 0.262 0.231
σ = 0.7 ρ = 1
1 1.38 0.452 0.651 0 0.201
2.545
2 2 1.048 0.763 0.377 0.264
ρ = 0.5
1 1.34 0.398 0.63 0 0.183
2.618
2 2 1.102 0.777 0.354 0.246
ρ = 0
1 1.26 0.294 0.583 0 0.163
—
2 2 1.206 0.801 0.315 0.233
σ = 1 ρ = 1
1 1.5 0.625 0.715 0 0.234
—
2 2 0.875 0.711 0.468 0.234
ρ = 0.5
1 1.5 0.625 0.715 0 0.234
—
2 2 0.875 0.711 0.468 0.234
ρ = 0
1 1.5 0.625 0.715 0 0.234
—
2 2 0.875 0.711 0.468 0.234
Definition of parameters and variables. As in Table A3; Tj : lump-sum tax; CV
agg in % of total income:
Aggregate compensating variation in % of aggregate income (welfare loss of decentralization).
Note. CV for (σ = 0.7, ρ = 0.5) is for σ = 0.68 because no SB equilibrium was found for σ = 0.7.
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Table A5: Decomposition of the welfare loss with local social planners (LSPs) for the baseline
values of σ and ρ.
j pj tj gj SWF CV
agg
II
1 0.597 0.006 0.081
0.5456 0.711
2 0.801 0.156 0.206
II & LSP1
1 0.596 0.011 0.083
0.5455 0.713
2 0.801 0.156 0.206
II & LSP2
1 0.597 0.006 0.081
0.5455 0.716
2 0.801 0.158 0.209
Definition of parameters and variables. As in Table A4; SWF : Level of the social welfare function.
Note. This table resembles version II from Table 3.“II & LSP1” indicates that in municipality 1 the tax rate
(and therefore the public provision level) has been determined by a local social planner, taking the majority
voting decision and the population distribution in municipality 2 as given. “II & LSP2” indicates the respective
case for a local social planner in municipality 2.
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Table A6: Sensitivity analysis by model version: Municipality characteristics and Compansat-
ing variation for σ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5.
j ybord Yj pj Tj tj gj CV
agg ybord Yj pj Tj tj gj CV
agg
First best Version I
Baseline 1 1.21 0.232 0.523 0.000 0.000 0.104 2.258 1.18 0.196 0.526 0.000 0.000 0.105 1.394
2 2 1.268 0.823 0.294 0.000 0.251 2 1.304 0.824 0.000 0.175 0.244
θ = 1.5 1 1.26 0.294 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.103 1.799 1.22 0.244 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.913
2 2 1.206 0.693 0.323 0.000 0.264 2 1.256 0.695 0.000 0.186 0.255
θ = 3.5 1 1.19 0.208 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.105 1.801 1.17 0.184 0.561 0.000 0.000 0.105 1.213
2 2 1.292 0.847 0.285 0.000 0.248 2 1.316 0.847 0.000 0.173 0.242
α low 1 1.24 0.269 0.543 0.000 0.000 0.082 1.650 1.21 0.232 0.546 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.991
2 2 1.231 0.815 0.245 0.000 0.204 2 1.268 0.816 0.000 0.145 0.199
α high 1 1.18 0.196 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.128 2.854 1.15 0.161 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.129 1.762
2 2 1.304 0.830 0.339 0.000 0.297 2 1.339 0.831 0.000 0.204 0.288
γ low 1 1.19 0.208 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.106 2.332 1.17 0.184 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.106 1.436
2 2 1.292 0.806 0.287 0.000 0.250 2 1.316 0.806 0.000 0.174 0.244
γ high 1 1.22 0.244 0.543 0.000 0.000 0.103 2.183 1.19 0.208 0.548 0.000 0.000 0.104 1.347
2 2 1.256 0.840 0.297 0.000 0.252 2 1.292 0.840 0.000 0.176 0.244
βx low 1 1.2 0.220 0.518 0.000 0.000 0.109 2.291 1.17 0.184 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.109 1.431
2 2 1.280 0.828 0.300 0.000 0.259 2 1.316 0.830 0.000 0.180 0.252
βx high 1 1.21 0.232 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.101 2.205 1.18 0.196 0.522 0.000 0.000 0.101 1.346
2 2 1.268 0.819 0.284 0.000 0.243 2 1.304 0.821 0.000 0.169 0.236
βh low 1 1.18 0.196 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.110 2.403 1.16 0.173 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.110 1.601
2 2 1.304 0.804 0.291 0.000 0.255 2 1.327 0.803 0.000 0.177 0.250
βh high 1 1.23 0.256 0.552 0.000 0.000 0.100 2.120 1.2 0.220 0.556 0.000 0.000 0.100 1.190
2 2 1.244 0.841 0.293 0.000 0.246 2 1.280 0.842 0.000 0.173 0.238
WWs inc 1 1.68 0.911 0.657 0.000 0.000 0.082 6.099 1.88 1.267 0.824 0.000 0.207 0.273 -0.191
2 2 0.589 0.752 0.754 0.000 0.333 2 0.233 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.127
WWs dec 1 1.33 0.384 0.756 0.710 0.000 0.321 13.535 1.26 0.294 0.585 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.815
2 2 1.116 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.080 2 1.206 0.793 0.000 0.237 0.316
Version II Decentralized
Baseline 1 1.28 0.319 0.597 0.000 0.006 0.081 0.711 1.457 0.561 0.680 0.000 0.086 0.114 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.801 0.000 0.156 0.206 2.000 0.939 0.749 0.000 0.147 0.185
θ = 1.5 1 1.27 0.306 0.404 0.000 0.002 0.082 0.369 1.493 0.614 0.531 0.000 0.100 0.125 0.000
2 2 1.194 0.683 0.000 0.159 0.211 2.000 0.886 0.591 0.000 0.147 0.184
θ = 3.5 1 1.28 0.319 0.637 0.000 0.005 0.080 0.580 1.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.545 0.131 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.824 0.000 0.155 0.205 2.000 1.500 0.884 0.000 0.159 0.238
α low 1 1.29 0.332 0.600 0.000 0.005 0.064 0.507 1.484 0.600 0.690 0.000 0.073 0.094 0.000
2 2 1.168 0.798 0.000 0.125 0.164 2.000 0.900 0.740 0.000 0.116 0.144
α high 1 1.27 0.306 0.594 0.000 0.007 0.099 0.867 1.426 0.517 0.668 0.000 0.096 0.133 0.000
2 2 1.194 0.804 0.000 0.187 0.248 2.000 0.983 0.760 0.000 0.179 0.228
γ low 1 1.28 0.319 0.581 0.000 0.006 0.081 0.719 1.441 0.538 0.656 0.000 0.082 0.112 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.780 0.000 0.156 0.206 2.000 0.962 0.733 0.000 0.149 0.188
γ high 1 1.28 0.319 0.612 0.000 0.006 0.081 0.689 1.470 0.581 0.702 0.000 0.090 0.116 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.821 0.000 0.155 0.205 2.000 0.919 0.764 0.000 0.146 0.183
βx low 1 1.27 0.306 0.595 0.000 0.001 0.083 0.745 1.448 0.549 0.680 0.000 0.089 0.117 0.000
2 2 1.194 0.807 0.000 0.161 0.213 2.000 0.951 0.755 0.000 0.152 0.192
βx high 1 1.28 0.319 0.593 0.000 0.003 0.077 0.717 1.466 0.574 0.680 0.000 0.084 0.111 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.798 0.000 0.151 0.199 2.000 0.926 0.743 0.000 0.143 0.178
βh low 1 1.28 0.319 0.581 0.000 0.007 0.083 0.768 1.441 0.538 0.653 0.000 0.085 0.115 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.778 0.000 0.160 0.211 2.000 0.962 0.735 0.000 0.152 0.192
βh high 1 1.28 0.319 0.613 0.000 0.005 0.078 0.628 1.470 0.580 0.706 0.000 0.086 0.112 0.000
2 2 1.181 0.823 0.000 0.151 0.200 2.000 0.920 0.764 0.000 0.143 0.179
WWs inc 1 1.86 1.230 0.827 0.000 0.149 0.193 -0.496 1.457 0.561 0.680 0.000 0.086 0.114 0.000
2 2 0.270 0.542 0.000 0.006 0.089 2.000 0.939 0.749 0.000 0.147 0.185
WWs dec 1 1.56 0.717 0.725 0.000 0.110 0.134 -0.375 1.457 0.561 0.680 0.000 0.086 0.114 0.000
2 2 0.783 0.710 0.000 0.137 0.168 2.000 0.939 0.749 0.000 0.147 0.185
Definition of parameters and variables. As in Table A4.
Note. “high” and “low” refer to 20% above and 20% below the respective baseline value. “WWs” are welfare
weights of households in the social welfare function (in the baseline version, each welfare weight is 1); for “WWs
inc”, welfare weights increase (1, 2 . . . , 101) and for “WWs dec” they decrease (101, 100, . . . , 1).
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Figure A1: First-best value of the social welfare function (SWF) for variations in the level of
spillovers σ and the border household yborder.
This surface plot describes the value of the SWF with ρ = 0.5. The degree of spillovers increases from left to
right. From the front to the back, the border household (yborder) between both municipalities varies. There
are three saddle-points of the SWF: a minimum at yborder = 1.5, a local maximum that would imply a small
rich municipality, and a global maximum with a small, poor municipality. The path along this saddle point is
reported in Table A4 (for ρ = 0.5). Note that with perfect spillovers (at the right), dividing the population
equally between both municipalities turns out to be optimal.
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Figure A2: First-best value of the social welfare function (SWF) for variations in the level of
rivalry ρ and the border household yborder.
This surface plot describes the achievable value of the SWF with σ = 0.3. The degree of rivalry decreases from
the back to the front. From left to right, the border household (yborder) varies. There are three saddle-points
of the SWF: a minimum at yborder = 1.5, a local maximum that would imply a small rich municipality, and
the global maximum with a small, poor municipality. The path along the latter is reported in Table A4 (for
σ = 0.3).
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Figure A3: First-best vs. decentralized equilibrium: Aggregated compensating variation
(CV agg) in % of total income for σ and ρ variations.
For σ > 0.78 and combinations of ρ sufficiently small and σ sufficiently large, we could not establish decen-
tralized income-segregating equilibria, as discussed in Section 3.3. Therefore, we could not compute aggregate
compensating variation levels for all combinations of σ and ρ, indicated by the ‘border’ of the surface in the
upper left of the figure. Note finally, that results depicted for σ = 0 are those for σ = 0.01, since we had
computational problems for some combinations with σ = 0.
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Figure A4: Household characteristics in FB and the fully decentralized equilibrium for a pub-
licly provided private good (σ = 0, ρ = 1): Individual transfer scheme r(y), disposable income
ydisp(y), utility level V (y), and compensating variation CV (y).
The small kinks in the first-best (black) lines above are the result of relying on a finite number of households
(101 in our case) to solve our model numerically. However, we do not split up the mass of households at the
border household, but assign them to one of the two municipalities, which implies that both municipalities
are not exactly equally inhabited. Increasing the number of modeled household types would smooth out these
kinks. 53
